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Summary 
Unlike competitive markets with theoretically infinite number of agents whose deci-
sions merge into a large mass of other agents’ decisions, forming prices as allocation 
parameters controlled by no one, international arena is characterized by a limited 
number of discernible subjects whose decisions have system-wide impacts and turn 
out significant for policies of other agents. Policies pursued by any country concern 
not only the country in question but influence other countries and oftentimes sig-
nificantly affect the degree and manner of reaching their policy objectives. Due to 
the limited number of acting entities the nexus of international interactions has 
a notable conflict potential. Small countries are in a special situation due to their 
almost implied modest power implying further a significant number of independent 
agents whose interests have to be seriously taken into account in framing their own 
development and many other policies. Policies of various countries come out visibly 
interdependent so that other agents’ interests and actions uninterruptedly define 
wide enough set of constraints to be observed in formulating and implementing 
development policies of the country in question. 
Particularly important are the large, economically developed and militarily pow-
erful countries. Their aspirations have to be carefully observed and meticulously 
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studied by the small and relatively weak countries. There might emerge, and in Ser-
bian countries almost regularly emerges, a conflict between highly valued national 
goals deeply rooted in history, popular myths and collective memory, on the one 
hand, and interests of the big powerful international players on the other. These are 
settings in which baleful strategic mistakes are occasionally made and in Serbian 
history the frequency of such mistakes was rather pronounced. There has been far 
above the optimum courage in Serbian history conspicuously exercised by both elites 
and popular masses. The consequences of such “determinations for the kingdom of 
heavens” are perilous and mistakes are dearly paid in terms of hundreds of thou-
sands of lost lives and wasted chances for economic and general social development. 
The paper ends with recommendation that the small countries endeavor to carefully 
fit into interests and policies of great powers, invest equally large efforts into choos-
ing the right allies and adjust pragmatically to their aspirations and, as the case 
might be, even to their orders. No matter how strange it may sound, bending flexibly 
to the interests of the mighty may be the optimal strategy of pursuing the genuine 
national objectives. For, no matter how elevated and majestic they are, they dwindle 
to little value if they are blocked in the process of realization and the high-minded 
efforts invested in their realization get ultimately frustrated.
Keywords: geopolitics, development policies, great powers, interdependence of 
decisions on international arena, the conflict between elevated national goals 
and the pragmatic exigencies, power as a relative concept, the dimensions of 
power, limitations of public policies. 
Резиме
За разлику од конкурентских тржишта са теоријски претпостављеним 
бесконачним бројем субјеката, чије се одлуке утапају у велику масу одлу-
ка које доносе други, резултујући у образовању цена као алокационих пара-
метара којима не управља нико, међународна сцена се карактерише огра-
ниченим бројем разазнатљивих актера чије одлуке имају учинке на нивоу 
система као целине и јављају се као значајне за политике других актера. 
Политике које води било која земља тичу се не само те земље него утичу 
и на друге земље, а често делују значајно на степен и начин остваривања 
циљева уграђених у њихове политике. Услед ограниченог броја делујућих 
активних чинилаца сплет интеракција на међународном плану има при-
метан конфликтни потенцијал. Мале земље су у посебном положају због 
своје безмало имплициране скромне моћи која даље имплицира постојање 
значајног броја независних субјеката чији интереси морају озбиљно да буду 
узети у обзир приликом обликовања њихових сопствених развојних и других 
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политика. Испоставља се да су политике разних земаља уочљиво међузави-
сне, тако да интереси и деловања других актера континуирано дефинишу 
довољно широк скуп ограничења која се морају уважавати у формулисању и 
реализации развојних политика посматране земље. 
Нарочито су важне велике, економски развијене и војно моћне земље. 
Њихове претензије морају да буду брижљиво праћене и темељно проуча-
ване кад је реч о малим и релативно слабим земљама. Може да искрсне, а у 
српским земљама скоро редовно искрсава, сукоб између високо вреднованих 
националних циљева дубоко усађених у повести, популарним митовима и 
колективном сећању, с једне стране, и интереса великих и моћних међуна-
родних играча, с друге. Ово су околности у којима покадшто могу да буду по-
чињене кобне грешке а у историји Срба била је доста изражена учесталост 
таквих промашаја. Количина храбрости била је у српској историји далеко 
изнад оптимума, и то како у редовима елита тако и међу широким маса-
ма. Последице таквих „опредељења за царство небеско” погубне су а грешке 
су скупо плаћане стотинама хиљада изгубљених живота и пропуштеним 
изгледима за економски и општи друштвени развитак. Рад се окончава са 
препоруком да би мале земље требало озбиљно да настоје да се пажљиво 
уклопе у интересе и политике великих сила, да уложе једнако велике напо-
ре у бирање подесних савезника, те да се прагматично прилагоде њиховим 
претензијама и, већ према околностима случаја, чак и њиховим налозима. 
Како год то могло да звучи бизарно, флексибилно приклањање интересима 
моћника може да се покаже као оптимална стратегија залагања за аутен-
тичне националне интересе. Јер, независно од тога колико су они узвише-
ни и величанствени, своде се на безначајну вредност ако су онемогућени у 
процесу остваривања, а племенити напори уложени у њихову реализацију 
бивају у крајњој линији разочарајуће осујећени.
Кључне речи: геополитика, развојне политике, велике силе, међузави-
сност одлука на међународном плану, сукоб између узвишених нацио-
налних циљева и захтева прагматичности, моћ као релативни појам, 
димензије моћи, лимитираност јавних политика. 
1. Introduction 
Greater topics, such as this one indicated in the title, require thoughtfully adapted 
methodological approach, the one that will be carried out with large and striking 
moves. It seems advisable to start from recalling some elementary but supporting 
and decisive components of large social entities whose prominent and essential 
aspects should be passed through the analytical machinery of economic science. 
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The term constraints, which dominates the selected title is one of those central 
and always current terms. Although various researchers would choose different 
collections of such concepts, we can expect without any major concerns to find 
quite a lot of overlapping between those lists composed by different authors. In 
addition to constraints that are a central concept in the title, the other two deter-
mining concepts could be preferences and alternatives.
Indeed, many theoretical instruments and tools which present a base for the 
economic science, and through which most valuable findings arise, are not only 
connected with three key categories in this one way or another, but they are de-
rived from them more or less directly. Even a cursory glance at the central, far-
reaching decisive segments of the economic analysis, announced at the begin-
ning of the good books, leads to the conclusion about the central role of these 
three categories. In a very effective and impressive introduction to his famous 
textbook Mankiw and Taylor (2008, p. 3-14) postulate ten principles of econom-
ics that are almost directly attributable to the three central categories where they 
find their cognitive points.
Among these decisive elements of the economics, the way they are perceived 
in their synthetic vista, they are all related to the three categories, but the follow-
ing have special significance. First and foremost is the choice - which, of course, 
is guided by preferences; it is made on alternative options and determined by the 
constrains without which it would be neither possible nor required - then the 
price is quoted to reflect the opportunity cost understood as the missed value of 
the alternative that was sacrificed for the sake of the given choice, where the value 
reflects and measures the preferences as the leading element in the selection; then 
the reaction of economic entities to incentives is emphasized, and these relate to 
alternatives and they are directly defined by preferences, while the essential char-
acter of trade is still underlined as a positive sum game and the role of markets 
in allocating resources in the environment that is defined by the constraints and 
managed by preferences in choosing between many alternatives. Below are further 
points which state that the standard of living depends on the productive potential 
of the given community - potential is the aggregate term for overall constraints 
the economy is faced with and due to which, guided by the preferences of the 
relevant entities, it must make respective choices based on the set of alternatives.
Constraints may also include particularly pronounced connections between 
the emission of money and inflationary tendencies and short-term substitution 
between inflation and unemployment; these functional connections are part of a 
specific technology established at the level of the system as a whole and as such 
they determine the constraints on each of the variables in these relationships: 
efforts to restrain inflation are faced with increasing unemployment and analo-
gously, it can be said the other way round. It is good to recall that similar conclu-
13
  
Ljubomir Madžar Geopolitical Constraints on Development Policies of Small Countries
sions, albeit in a modified analytical setting, are easy to perform also from con-
ceptual plans which other authors use to formulate their presentation of basics of 
economics; Begg et al (2010, p. 3-14) emphasize the concept of opportunity cost 
as a preference-driven choice to the available alternatives in terms of total con-
straints and the bounds of production possibilities as the aggregate term of these 
constraints at the level of the system as a whole. Similar emphases are easy to rec-
ognize in our literature: in his recently published textbook of microeconomics N. 
Trivić (2016, p. 162-7) distinguishes opportunity cost as a fundamentally decisive 
concept that is, in terms of the inevitable constraints, a reflection of alternatives in 
interactions which are always guided by preferences.
2. Individual constraints generated by interdependencies of national 
policies in the global economic and political space
Acknowledging constraints and identifying their implications is one thing, and 
their identification in economic and social constellations is completely another 
thing. The existence of constraints and search for their numerous and often hardly 
discernable implications has always been a cognitive and active challenge which 
was difficult to take. Number of objective constraints is generally higher than 
those which are the subject of social perception and in respect of which it could 
and should be possible to make necessary accompanying economic, political and 
broader social adjustments. Many of the actions of economic policy turned out to 
be unsuccessful due to insufficiently visible or completely unknown constraints 
which in designing these actions could not have been taken into account. There-
fore, there is a sharp criticism of economic and political operations that are not 
fully justified, since they are based on the absence of results which due to these 
invisible disturbances could not be achieved. It is possible, although rarely, to find 
the reverse combinations where there is no criticism due to an overestimation 
of obstacles and constraints which are publicly believed to be more serious and 
more restrictive than they are actually.
The paper deals with a special, rarely properly viewed and typically ignored 
constraints that greatly affect both the pace and the ways and models of eco-
nomic and social development and have not been observed enough, and only in 
exceptional cases they are the subject of conscious institutional adjustments and 
thoughtful measures of economic and social policy. It is a complex web of geopo-
litical forces which are the expression and product of variable geopolitical situa-
tion, which can be defined as broadly understood configuration of relations, in-
terests and power between individual countries and international organizations, 
understood as a general framework within which individual countries conduct 
their policies and realize their global strategic objectives. In these complex con-
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stellations regularly and properly, through the centuries and even millennia, we 
have powerful state entities or coalitions of smaller countries that dominate in a 
given geo-strategic area and impose their interests and supporting policies on a 
multitude of less powerful entities.
Bžežinski (2001, p. 14-28) extensively and systematically monitors the evolu-
tion of geopolitical changes and geostrategic tendencies over long historical peri-
ods before and after the Roman Empire, and finds that all historical epochs were 
characterized by the existence of extremely large forces that established their he-
gemony as the domination over the large number of smaller state communities. 
Rome, China, the Mongol Empire, the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire, 
the British colonial creation “where the sun did not set”, then the Soviet Union 
and, most recently, the United States as the only remaining truly dominant world 
power - these are all examples of universal historical legality consisting of the fact 
that every epoch and every geostrategically defined, globally relevant territory 
had, and to this day has had, its hegemon. An important aspect in which it is 
possible to monitor and interpret the overall history of mankind is the one that 
consists of the interaction of hegemon and smaller entities over which hegemon 
manages to establish and maintain its dominance. 
It is clear that the hegemonic policy defines and reproduces constraints under 
which less powerful entities operate too. Hegemon, as a rule which does not take 
any exceptions, is large in all relevant dimensions, so its decisions, on average and 
individually observed, tend to be large and far-reaching. Such decisions generate 
effects within a large area of potential impact and affect a large number of enti-
ties on the international political scene, and often most directly affect significant 
number of entities. And in its routine procedures hegemon affects many others 
and, since these decisions are followed by numerous versatile adjustments, the 
decisions produce systemic effects even when their maker does not have any in 
mind nor sets them as a goal. Hegemon cannot help but expose itself as a factor 
of marked changes even in the broadest system environment.
Power is a relative term (Horvat 1984, p. 60-2): the power of any entity is seen 
as possibility that other entities will, in their patterns of behavior to a greater or 
lesser extent, follow the preferences and the global objectives of the hegemon. In 
its essential components of power it has the characteristics of a zero sum game: 
since the power of the nature of things forms and changes only in relation to oth-
ers, an increase in power at certain points of a broad and complex group of coun-
tries must be accompanied by reducing power in the other areas. This regularity 
applies primarily to political power whose definitional characteristic of domina-
tion is or more or less pronounced subordination. However, for other forms of 
power it is possible to conceptualize changes that bring an increase in power of 
all relevant entities within the group. 
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Constraints that stem from unequal distribution of power in terms of small 
countries, and especially from the existence of such hegemon as - in the dimen-
sion of power - markedly superior countries, are now quite easy to identify. Large 
and powerful countries have their own interests, and they also get the power 
from the capacity to implement the interests within the given limits. The interests 
go far beyond the geographical boundaries of individual state units and territo-
rial demarcation of the countries. Interests spill far over these borders to oth-
er states, which are much less powerful than the hegemon. Hegemon does not 
match equally all patterns of behavior of those it can influence due to its superior 
power, and from that it follows directly that it will endeavor to ensure such pat-
terns of behavior of the other, less powerful entities that match its interests.
To the extent hegemon is willing to and, thanks to the power, capable of im-
posing patterns which suit it on entities in surrounding, they are obviously im-
posed and manifested as constraints on the operation of these - in the dimension 
of power - inferior subjects. Constraints on the less powerful result from the in-
terest of the more powerful, and the hardest restrictions arise from the hegemon’s 
interest in the given geo-strategic area. It should be noted that this reasoning fully 
expressed all three main categories of economic approach to social reality which 
were mentioned in the introduction: constraints are directly the subject of this 
explanation, since they are result of the interest of hegemon, and sometimes the 
result of the interest of those that do not operate exactly as hegemons but are 
remarkably more powerful than those they affect; it is evident that in the back-
ground of these interactions we have preferences of those that affect the behav-
ior of the other entities. There is, finally, the following important fact: since the 
impact on others is only one way of realizing the interests of those who are in 
possession of the necessary power, it is clear that there are also alternatives that 
can be classified into those relating to their own resources and efforts of hegemon 
and the other directed at achieving relevant desideratum through unidirectional 
influence on the actions of other entities in the complex international political 
constellation.
Does out of this unidirectional influence of the more powerful countries, es-
pecially the hegemon, on the actions and policies of other, less powerful entities, 
follow that powerful countries are deprived of constraints that arise from inter-
national interactions? Absolutely not. Looking for ways and means of defense 
against excessive encroachment of hegemon in the affairs of smaller countries, 
these find ways of developing defensive coalitions. If the pressure of hegemon 
is too great, smaller and less powerful entities in its environment will find, often 
more or less spontaneously, forms and methods of uniting which enables efficient 
countering excessive hegemonic aspirations. History knows cases of successful 
opposition of alliance to a powerful dominant force that in its dominance was 
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unable, or simply did not want to find the right balance. One has to remember a 
spectacular historical episode in which Napoleon was definitely defeated by the 
so-called coordinated efforts of the Holy coalition. 
In international political relations there are also established broad-based and 
stable equilibrium constellations which hegemon cannot easily disturb or which 
manifest themselves as quite unattractive for a radical encroachment since the 
costs of such interventions are prohibitively high, or risks are too big. Hegemon 
also has its own calculation of costs and benefits, and coalition that imposes its 
high anticipated costs of aggressive operation actually imposes as a determinant 
of constraints on its own behavior. Life in the community, even in the inter-
national community of states, exempts no one from obstacles and restrictions 
whose generation is inherent to the community.
Therefore, both the large and the small, powerful and inferior powers are ex-
posed to constraints, but there is no doubt that the restriction resulting from 
the interactions does not affect everyone equally. It is not surprising that those 
powerful are in this dimension in disproportionally better position: they impose 
more restrictions on others, based on which they achieve wide range of interests, 
whereas small countries can only appear as the weaker entities in these interac-
tions. Relations in establishing mutual restrictions are extremely asymmetrical, 
so in this respect the case of small countries emerges as paradigmatic, and re-
garding their development policies the influence of the international impulses 
manifests itself as an exceptionally powerful and sometimes as a crucial.
3. The interdependence of actions and policies  
in the international strategic area 
Fundamental and far-reaching feature of the international political scene is a 
small number of entities and a clear recognition of their decisions and conse-
quences arising from their autonomous choices. The effects of decisions clearly 
go beyond the boundaries of the state entity that makes these decisions, and their 
unavoidable spillovers across national borders inevitably affect other countries, 
with the possible intensity that enables their retaliatory reactions. Hence there is 
the resulting interdependence of decisions and policies and a clear need to con-
sider the interests of other entities on the international stage in drafting appropri-
ate moves. From the established interdependence restrictions on the policy result 
in: anticipation of mentioned retaliatory reaction has the result of precautionary 
exclusion of some actions, which would otherwise be very attractive in relation 
to the objectives as landmarks of national policies. Namely, the consequences of 
possible responses to the measures within the given policy may be worse and 
accompanied by large losses in relation to the expected benefits of the policies 
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which these restrictions would not take into account. Thereby, the constraints on 
the economic and political actions, and even on the global development strate-
gies covering long future periods, are quite directly woven in the current policy 
and the one that should define the developmental trajectory in the longer-term 
perspective. 
The constellation where public political decisions are shaped and implement-
ed with consequences for the international environment - and that includes all 
interactions of the state with other countries - is very specific and structurally 
different from market environments which are regularly included in microeco-
nomic analysis. Namely, in the market configurations, especially those that are 
the subject of the usual theoretical abstraction embedded in standard definitions 
of competitive market, the number of subjects is large (in the pure theory it is 
infinitely large), and the effect of the policy conceptualized and implemented by 
each of them – for theoretical considerations is negligible. Where there is a large 
number of subjects there is a large number of decisions, a negligible size of each 
subject (in a mathematical sense its dimensions are zero in relation to the system 
as a whole) clearly implies negligible individual policies.
Negligible is in this context precisely defined as infinitesimal weigh and insig-
nificant impact of individual decisions in relation to the total mass of the deci-
sions through which the given economic system functions. Individual behavior 
and effects of individual decisions are drowning, metaphorically speaking, in a 
number of decisions that on the current and every other basis are generated in the 
overall economic system. The result of drowning is aggregation of the huge (“in-
finite”) number of decisions in large aggregates of the total supply and demand, 
and, based on the interaction of these two aggregates, the allocation parameters 
that all operators have to take as set and which they inevitably adapt to. No entity 
controls the whole of the system: as there are no entities that can significantly af-
fect the overall demand or supply, it is even less likely that there will be someone 
able to control, first of all, the market price and then other possible allocation 
parameters. What happens at the level of the whole, no one controls; parameters 
that are formed at the aggregate level with the interactions between supply and 
demand for all subjects are exogenously given and the only option that is avail-
able to them is optimal adapting to those externally defined numerical indicators.
The stage of international interaction has no structural characteristics of the 
described micro-economically formalized market environment. At this stage, 
operators are limited in number, individually discernible with their policies rel-
evant to decision-making processes of other entities and reaching their goals. 
In principle, every decision affects all other relevant entities in the international 
environment, and the consequences arising from the individual decisions of any 
entity may be large enough for a number of other entities to cause their above-
18
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mentioned retaliatory reactions. This means that the forms of rational decision-
making of any observed isolated entity can not be independent from the pref-
erences and objectives of other entities. Anticipation of their possible reactions 
and preventive refraining from decisions that could give rise to larger reactions 
are equivalent to the occurrence and calculated participation in the process of 
decision-making about those constraints which result from the international in-
terdependence of policies and the corresponding operation of a group of entities 
on the international stage. No entity can afford complete autonomous behavior 
that would prevail in the absence of international relations. 
Structural differences between globally relevant environments where the 
states maintain their public policies and competitive markets formalized by mi-
croeconomic theory have resulted in the application of essentially different ana-
lytical instruments. Those are theoretical models and algorithms through which 
decision-making processes are described and predicted, as well as the processes 
of evolution of relevant variables as an object of these decisions, within the two 
structurally differentiated environments. If changes and the movements within 
the competitive market structures provide formalization using standard mathe-
matical optimization, especially techniques which optimize the function with the 
given constraints, with eventual formalization of constraints of non-negativity of 
the relevant variables, the interaction between agents on the international politi-
cal stage may be satisfactorily formalized only using Game Theory.
4. Possible games in international interactions and turnaround 
perspectives with hazards of global turmoil 
Imperative of the application of game theory to a group of processes taking place 
on the international stage has significant and far-reaching consequences. The 
spectrum of these consequences is so broad that it certainly cannot be the subject 
of a systematic analysis of the work of such a limited scope. Game theory has be-
come highly formalized discipline with the accumulated vast literature. Authori-
tative accounts of this discipline were given by the national scientific produc-
tion, and the most complete and coherent presumably is the one that was given 
ten years ago by Stojanović B. (2005). Here are just a few highlights, specially 
designed points in game theory, those of particular importance for the consid-
eration of constraints imposed on the national public policies from the field of 
international interactions.
First of all, game theory already at the abstract analytical level does not pro-
vide as accurate and concretized, unambiguous mathematical predictions as it 
is the case when using standard mathematical optimization apparatus in the de-
scription and parametric testing of microeconomic processes. This smaller cer-
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tainty remains pronounced specificity of game theory, despite the fact that for 
many categories of games, reliable algorithms for finding appropriate solutions 
were developed (Stojanović 2005, p. 73-89, 136-69). This leads to the conclusion 
that the margins of uncertainty in game theory are far beyond and therefore the 
possibility of making predictions of reactive decisions of operators in interna-
tional interactions is much smaller.
There are few properties in most widely defined class of decision-making pro-
cesses that reduce their potential effectiveness so much and increase the hazards 
of failures and wrong choices as it is the case with uncertainty. One consequence 
of this limited specificity of formal solutions offered by game theory is the lack 
of reliability, sometimes limited, which, through the expected reactions of state 
entities from the international environment, can identify operational constraints 
imposed on domestic economic policy on that basis. If the precautionary prin-
ciple in such a vague situation dictates a more conservative approach, the result 
could be overestimating the constraints that should be reckoned when planning 
the economic policy. On the other hand, the lack of specificity and very limited 
concretization of alternative outcomes in game theory, the outcomes dependent 
on factors with resulting approximate and unreliable assumptions, result in many 
risks associated with reactions from the environment remaining unnoticed and 
logically feasible restrictions from these reactions remaining completely unfore-
seeable and therefore ignored. Turning to one or the other direction - overstate-
ment and insufficient respect, even ignoring the constraints - makes policy-mak-
ing difficult and precipitates its quality below the level which would prevail in the 
absence of these complications.
State policies depend to a large extent on prevailing beliefs about what the be-
liefs of others are (Stojanović 2005 p. 432), and the beliefs of the “others” similarly 
depend on our own beliefs: that formation of beliefs about the beliefs of others 
and the creation of beliefs how the processes of creating “our” beliefs about the 
beliefs of others work... can be refracted through multiple interdependent de-
grees conforming to extremely complex structures which further make decision-
making processes complicated to a large extent. The structures that are formal-
ized by game theory and that can only be analytically studied based on it and 
operationalized to the required level, are indeed extremely complex and full of 
hazards so the public-political operations in a number of situations are not ad-
equate and therefore they are about to cause serious disruptions and huge losses.
Nash equilibrium deserves to be specially mentioned (Stojanović 2005 p. 117-
35, especially 121-4, and 135) as the constellation that under sufficiently realis-
tic assumptions shows analytically demonstrable tendencies of establishing, and 
that is in a principle far from the optimum for the system as a whole, where the 
system is defined as a group of all relevant entities on the observed international 
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stage. The idea of  Nash equilibrium is very simple. Each entity, within a group 
with sufficient number of entities, maximizes its objective function. Since this 
maximization is achieved by maximizing the same behavior for all other enti-
ties within the group, each optimum depends on the decisions, i.e. on optimal 
solutions calculated by all other entities. The system has no mechanism, nor can 
it have, that would guarantee that the individual optima of individual operators 
would be set up in accordance with the best possible solution for the system as a 
whole, i.e. for a group of entities observed as a functional community. Each entity 
chooses its individual optimum with respect to the analog election of all other 
entities, but that optimum remains in a global sense flawed at the level of totality 
of the optimal solutions for all entities within a given group.
In other words, in the system there is no impulse to move the whole toward 
the global optimum because it is the choice for each subject the optimum decided 
upon until other entities hold their local optimum. Adhering to the individual 
optimum, with mutual adjustments that link them to those optimums perma-
nently, entities in their totality deprive themselves of the possibilities to move the 
system as a whole to a global optimum, which in this system of local optimiza-
tion actually remains inscrutable. To move the system to the global optimum, it 
is necessary to have the organization of mutual coordination between decisions 
and policies (Stojanović 2005, p. 425-35, especially 432-3), such that does not 
exist in this system. Nash equilibrium can also be interpreted as a special form 
of generalized constraints: all subjects are simultaneously limited in the sense that 
they cannot achieve superior global optimum for all that is otherwise available to 
the system with the prevailing technology and available resources.
It is also worth mentioning the fact that game theory found one of the most 
fertile areas of its application precisely in the field of international relations and 
inter-state interaction. In their book on the global political economics Gill and 
Law (1988, p. 32-8) emphasize the application of game theory on the web of in-
ternational interdependences and in the orientation of the appropriately struc-
tured games it offers one of the most powerful points of entire text. This is not 
surprising since it is a very complex system with a limited number of entities 
which generally make their decisions independently, have differentiated objec-
tive functions and, often, even the important elements of these functions that 
are directly opposed. There is no consistent institutionalized mechanism of com-
munication between them, coordination of decisions runs with great obstacles 
and uncertainties, and when communication channels are established, the likeli-
hood of harmonization of decision remains low due to the lack of mutual trust 
and because of well-known and extraordinarily important fact that a violation of 
promises at the level of each entity becomes particularly attractive when all oth-
ers keep to their promises! 
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5. Potential conflicts of interstate interests in the light of game theory 
Crucially important fact of inevitably differentiated foreign policy and foreign 
economic interests of individual sovereign states is effectively presented with el-
emental prisoner’s dilemma game (Gill and Law, p. 32-4), and more developed 
varieties of games serve well to concretize further this powerful idea. This is the 
context in which the idea of  building mechanisms of cooperation is fully ex-
pressed, as well as the importance of repetitive games in which participants have 
to count with future consequences for policy violations in the current period and 
even a possible positive effects of domination of sufficiently powerful hegemon 
that has the means and ways to punish offenders. Economic effects and safety are 
the key elements that drive entities on the international stage to violate or fulfil 
their promises, as they drive the hegemon to opt to invest effort and resources to 
introduce a minimum order to the community of principally autonomous state 
units to keep it on a lasting basis. Availability of necessary knowledge and infor-
mation have great importance in behavior on the international scene, and a lot 
of dysfunctional and / or even destructive behaviors can be explained with the 
scarcity of these two key elements for rational and even in a broader sense con-
structive decision-making. As in other areas, the lack of knowledge and informa-
tion imposes itself as the root cause of chaotic tendencies in relations between 
countries. 
An important role in foreign policy and foreign economic relations play, of 
course, internal, i.e. domestic political relations and social processes that take 
place under their influence. It is known, for example, that in the last few dec-
ades a number of strata of the developed countries, most often identified with 
the name middle class, together with the so-called working class, which based on 
their economic position and social status came much closer to the middle class 
a long ago, were in surprisingly unfavorable economic situation. In the absence 
of unhindered mobility of factors, turbulently increasing international trade has 
contributed to international standardization of numerous income categories. 
Chinese workers, for example, are not in the position to move to developed 
countries to look for higher incomes, and, through competition in the labor mar-
ket, gain more profits for themselves while reducing the salaries of local employ-
ees. But in the spirit of the famous Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, the effects which 
could not be achieved with labor mobility are largely achieved through interna-
tional trade: consumers in developed countries, including in particular the US, 
are increasingly being supplied from much cheaper Chinese, Indian, and other 
import rather than buying expensive domestic goods. Interactions are trans-
ferred through known mechanisms from the product market to the market fac-
tors, causing their far-reaching adjustments. The world of labor in the developed 
countries is hit as a whole (compare Diton 2016). Consumers cannot find any 
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reasons to buy more expensive domestic products instead of much cheaper im-
ported ones nor is there a logic according to which an American worker should 
be paid ten times more than the Chinese for more or less the same performance. 
The reorientation to the import as a cheaper source of supply means not just 
reducing the demand for goods of domestic origin but also - which is more haz-
ardous - reducing the demand for broadly defined categories of labor that was 
involved in the production of such expensive domestic goods. 
Reduced demand in the labor market caused by the unexpectedly broad front, 
produces, in parallel with the rise in unemployment, adequate equally massive 
stagnation and even decline in incomes, and when such a high percentage of the 
population finds seriously and even dramatically compromised in their standard 
and economic status, then it must entail serious social tensions. These tensions 
have to express themselves in the political sphere and reflect a struggle for a new 
foreign economic protectionism. The whole system of international trade may 
be brought into question since the release of macroeconomic trends leads to tec-
tonic fractures in standard and economic situation of a large part of the popula-
tion of developed countries. This is a broad area where the foreign economic 
policies, particularly those in the sphere of international trade, are faced with 
great turnarounds and real turmoil which are about to generate powerful shocks 
in international political relations, and fundamentally change the landscape of 
relations among sovereign states. 
Quite predictably it leads to occurrence and further intensification of their 
efforts to influence others and possibly radically restructure present order in the 
field of international interdependence. New initiatives and new pressures are on 
their way with all accompanying threats and blackmails, whose flows, and to a 
lesser extent effects, could be satisfactorily predicted. Despite the generally appli-
cable standards, one cannot rule out unilateral moves directed at the protection 
of those broad, socially more vulnerable working classes in developed countries, 
and they can produce conflicts whose dynamics is even more difficult to predict, 
but known in advance to be tense and multilaterally hazardous. International 
atmosphere radically changes, among other things, in a particularly delicate di-
mension of finally vulnerable economic position of the world’s hegemon, vulner-
able in terms of important changing of collection of available options in foreign 
policy under pressure from severe internal political tensions.
6. Public policies in the atmosphere oriented toward the entities of 
unequal size and widely differentiated power
In the introduction it has already been pointed out that the world with the poli-
cies of individual countries is characterized by entities of strikingly different sizes 
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and varied power. It was also pointed out that in the constellation of entities in-
volved in the network of interactive interdependencies hegemons are lawfully 
and predictably singled out as subjects that are powerful enough to establish 
a domination over entities in their environment, which allows them to exert a 
strong influence on entities in that environment and to modify and direct impor-
tant components of their behavior, according to their interests. He also pointed 
out that those small in the scope and power, dominated entities are not without 
impact on those that established dominance in the relevant environment, but 
these relations are strikingly asymmetric: the impact of the large is unequally 
greater than the return impact of the small on the large. The possibility of form-
ing a coalition somewhat modifies this conclusion, but it certainly does not deny. 
Since that requires coordination and a high degree of agreement of a number of 
entities, coalitions are difficult to form, and when they are established they are 
very quickly destroyed. As in the case of respecting the rules of mass behavior in 
any order, violation of the rules becomes even more attractive if there is a higher 
number and greater consistency of other entities adhering to these rules.
The situation is getting complicated with additional hegemons, so in one uni-
fied interaction space more than one entity operate with the possible and accom-
plished domination. The emergence of multiple hegemons is relatively new in 
world history and conditioned by the advancement of transportation and com-
munication technology, which connected the world with its planetary extents 
in almost unique interactive space. In the past, for example, China could have 
dominated in its part of the world since the interactions of areas under its domi-
nation with the areas dominated by Western European countries with colonial 
pretensions or, in the distant past, the Mongol Empire, were almost negligible. In 
the modern world, which is in a prominent way functionally unified, there is a 
possibility for more hegemons to act, and in the group of smaller countries there 
are relations of the asymmetry of power and possibility of unequal reciprocal op-
eration with developing a relations that could be characterized as a dominance of 
the small: the impact of stronger entity is still greater than the influence that goes 
the other way, but these influences are much smaller than the impact of hegemon 
and are not the same as dominance in the strict sense, i.e. effective superiority 
inherent to hegemon as prominently larger and more powerful entity. 
The advantage of dominance in relation to clearly inferior status of being 
dominated is one of the essential reasons for the tendency of individual coun-
tries - the aspirations that are in the history practically taken as conclusively 
proven - to expand and increase, to accumulate power by assuming that it is an 
increasing function of state mass, regardless of the attribute in which power is 
manifested and measured. This may be the population size, economic potential, 
military power or disposal of some properties that in the broader international 
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community confirm to be undeniably attractive. In historical retrospect the ele-
ment of size of the observed state was generally territory, the more so because it 
is an important component of both economic and defense potential, as well as 
other dimensions of the size, especially the population and fiscal capacity, highly 
correlated with the territory. 
Conquering new territories for some countries was a source of economic and 
social vitality during long periods, often centuries. Only in recent times terri-
tories have lost importance and power of a state, and especially ceased to be an 
element in which the state sought to achieve its expansion. One of the important 
reasons why territories lost their dimensions through which countries fulfill their 
expansion is the international arrangement that has a planetary scale and which 
draws its far-reaching dimension from the universal consensus of the entire in-
ternational community and consists of the great principle of the inviolability of 
borders. This arrangement has grown from universal consent that the modern 
world is united in saving itself from conflicts so frequent in the past and so typi-
cally related to the ongoing efforts directed at redistribution of territory. 
It is not easy to make an exhaustive list of the elements that determine the 
tendency of governments to maximize their power, as a way of achieving this 
general desideratum to encourage population growth, develop their economies, 
raise the efficiency of its institutions, improve technology, persistently work on 
the expansion of all other components of knowledge and, in the most gener-
al terms, raise the level of their culture. The culture is identified as a category 
that can be defined at different levels of generality, and when it is conceptually 
defined broadly enough, it can cover almost all specifically understood dimen-
sions of power: technology and everything that it is conditioned by it, the level 
of economic development as the epitome of crucially important material culture, 
lifestyle which can prove to be a powerful instrument to influence other nations 
and states, particularly when it becomes the subject of mass imitation and social 
organization as a determinant of broad social efficiency, i.e. the effectiveness with 
which work processes are performed and development processes are guided not 
only in economy but also in other numerous and wide areas of social life far be-
yond.
This was the identification of the main components of what is at the top of 
the list of priorities of actions for every state and what is included in a broad 
concept that is here terminologically defined as power. Power is, therefore, a great 
desideratum at the level of state units but also the means and a way of achiev-
ing its maximum realization. It is a desideratum because it is decomposed into 
components that are desirable in the obvious, self-assuming way: economic de-
velopment as, among other things, the material basis of living standards and the 
welfare of the population, technology and other elements of widely understood 
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knowledge, yet widely understood (effective) social organization, and, more spe-
cifically, the institutions through which it is operationalized, internationally at-
tractive behavior patterns with lifestyle and, of course, more narrowly defined by 
the various components of culture. 
In this list of desiderata that stand behind the category of power and that are 
the determinants of inspiration for the maximum magnification of power there is 
one that should not be left out and which emerges in many contexts as the most 
important actually. That is security. In international relations and interactions 
there are numerous and in some periods unfavorably frequent conflict situations 
which are, as a rule - with the exceptions that almost need not to be mentioned - 
resolved through the balance of power. More powerful entities in these relations 
easily find ways to impose their solutions, and the weaker accept them if they 
follow the imperatives of rationality. It often happens that the weak oppose the 
stronger, but they typically do so to their damage. In this resistance it is exposed 
to additional costs, damages that would be avoided in the case of respecting the 
superior power of entities with whom they came into conflict, separate, poorly 
foreseeable losses arising from the conflict, which would certainly be avoided in 
the case of accepting the dictates of the one that is undeniably more powerful. All 
considered the ultimate solution for this daring entity with less power is predict-
ably less favorable than the one which would have been created if such a futile 
conflict had not been started. It’s not easy to list all the disadvantages that the 
weaker is exposed to when they come into conflict with the stronger.
In this review culture is used as a term that is not unambiguously defined. 
First, we can talk about above mentioned specific elements of culture that can be 
approximated with some activities in this field: film, theater, literature and pub-
lishing, television, heterogeneous and strongly indented field of media, a number 
of activities in the entertainment world ... When, for example, it is said that the 
Chinese easily and massively accept and affirmatively perceive American mov-
ies and TV series, and that the restaurants such as MacDonald in China found 
fertile ground for their swift expansion and that the reverse impact is almost out 
of question, much has been said about the relative force of two cultures, and thus 
about the component of power arising from cultural influences.
However, there is another sense given to the concept of a culture in which 
culture is seen as the most general characteristics of a society, as a feature in 
which the society is reflected entirely and which is seen as an indicator of broadly 
understood civilization development. Culture can be understood as a reflection 
and rate of modernization in a given time. It should kept in mind that the mod-
ernization is not a concept that is related to the most recent period, i.e. for the 
present; each time and each period have their own specific modernization, and it 
is easy to conceive that the modernization applies to those which in most widely 
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understood social development in their time managed effectively to establish 
themselves and find ahead of others regarding the level of essential and social 
desideratum.
Bžežinski (2001, p. 23-5) strongly insists on culture as a component of general 
government and social power. He is very clear about the specification of individ-
ual dimensions of culture. In his opinion culture is not a matter of arrogance of 
an ambitious country that simply self-proclaims it superiority in the synthetically 
understood dimension; culture must be recognized and widely recognized by oth-
ers, and these are entities that are already under the domination of a given more 
powerful entity or they are about to become. Cultural superiority is, in other 
words, conditioned and demonstrated by the judgment of others and not by their 
own. Although the culture in a broad sense indicates a component of power, and 
thereby a factor of domination, we can talk about the culture of the weaker enti-
ties in the group of countries that make up the international community. The 
culture of the weaker will not, of course, manifest itself through domination - this 
option is out of the reach for the one that has less power and is at the lower cul-
tural level - but through flexible and purposeful marching the limitations that are 
objectively given, including not less important those arising from the policy of 
entities clearly more powerful than they are. Culture is therefore a factor of power 
and an important factor in establishing dominance of hegemony over the plural-
ity of satellites. The intriguing question is, and probably the reason for a number 
of disagreements, can we talk about the reverse causal loop between power and 
culture: can we, in other words, at least selectively, and even in a small group of 
some specific constellations, conclude that the power is the sign of culture as 
culture is the holder of power, can we sometimes speak of greater power as an 
indicator, as well as of a proof of higher culture? 
Some would argue - and others would vigorously oppose it, thus providing the 
basis for a fruitful and exciting intellectual debate - that necessary and sufficient 
level of culture was not expressed on 27 March 1941 in the streets of Belgrade 
during the famous demonstrations as it was in the small Western European coun-
tries where less heroism was demonstrated, but with their pragmatic adjustment, 
on a massive scale, they saved lives. Cultural superiority of hegemon or simply - 
for given occasions - a satisfactory level of culture has extraordinary importance 
and high value in maintaining the dominance: culture is a substitute for the brute 
force in the way that the dominated, through culture and thanks to it, without 
giving much resistance, accept a superior position of those who in a given inter-
action found themselves in a position of superior side. With admiration and even 
with some amazement they emphasize unexpectedly small number of soldiers 
and modest defensive potential with which the Great Britain controlled its vast 
colonial empire. 
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7. The limits of power in relation to growing range of state entities
With the size of a given state entity - the size observed through the territory, 
population, economic potential ... – its power grows too. One could ask the ques-
tion how it is possible that in the ongoing search for ways of increasing power the 
whole world does not become a Mega-state under the control of a single author-
ity. The answer is that government entities must be managed, and that the activity 
of management, just as all human activity, faces - this time quite specific - the law 
of diminishing returns. With the size of the object to be controlled the reach and 
scope of management activities grow too, with an increase in the volume the cor-
responding additional control pulses grow and, of course, resources that enable 
them give less and less effect. It is difficult to manage large units, and the greater 
they are the harder it is. Again, we are faced with a known triad of economic cat-
egories: constraints of the knowledge, skilled personnel, information and related 
system and material resources, assumed by some control systems, impose limits 
on aspirations of top management, i.e. its preference for power and expansion 
of space for domination, and the inability to control large facilities with master 
logic of objective necessity compels the ruling structures to settle for less majestic 
alternatives.
Among the alternatives that arise as a substitute for the large state units in 
which and from which they rule or dominate over others, hegemons play a key 
role of those reified through the formation of coalitions. In the introduction coa-
litions are already mentioned as creations that allow the small to join under cer-
tain conditions and jointly restrain the reckless aggressive hegemon. They are 
at the same time an important factor of limiting the growth of large state units 
that establish a dominant role on the broad areas. Forming a coalition is part of 
a much wider process of association of autonomous entities in larger wholes, in 
a way which does not imply the renunciation of their autonomy. History shows 
that the merger does not contribute to the creation of associations of the coun-
tries that will cover the entire planet. On the contrary, integration of autonomous 
entities brings the creation of powerful large blocks, which generally oppose each 
other and the cause of high tensions on a planetary scale and global hazards; they 
can question the whole world with all the achievements of civilization that make 
it so impressive in many respects. And these stratifications of entities into com-
petitive and opposing blocks are the basis for strong interdependence in interac-
tions and relations between societies and countries: the mere inclusion in one of 
the blocks results in one subject significantly affecting the interests and position 
of other entities with its decision because this classification obviously changes 
power relations among the blocks. 
Without going further into these dreary considerations, may only be added 
that such polarized joining is a part of a much broader empirical law that includes 
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organizational formations at different hierarchical levels, even single individuals. 
It is a fact that man is a social being and that there is neither survival nor valuable 
affirmation of humanity outside the community. However, it is true that people, 
besides inclination towards integration into the entire differentiated hierarchy 
of collective, have a tendency to group confrontation wholeheartedly accepting 
larger collectivities as media of such confrontations. It is interesting that this ten-
dency has experimentally been demonstrated. Akerlof and Shiller (2010, p. 205) 
report on an indicative experiment in which a large group of students is divided 
into two groups, in a way that one group assigned students with odd date of birth, 
and the other with the even date of birth. Through not very particularly long and 
not very large mass of interaction these two groups developed sense of belong-
ing and awareness of a separate identity, which further led to the emergence of 
loyalty to a group, to certain group interests, as well as to the conflicts that pre-
dictable originated from the opposed aspirations. It seems that quite analogous 
tendencies occur in a group of sovereign states as autonomous entities in foreign 
economic and foreign political decision-making.
The formation of blocks, and thus limitation of the power of hegemon, some-
what mitigates but by no means abolishes restrictions imposed on small coun-
tries on the basis of unfavorable geopolitical constellations. The small remain 
handicapped to the extent to which they bow to desideratum of rationality, di-
rected toward finding flexible and restricted patterns of behavior that offer lim-
ited but valuable opportunities for survival in a harsh world always dominated 
by the most powerful. This makes it more challenging and difficult to formulate 
long-term development strategies, and even survival, and generates the needs for 
particularly refined knowledge, i.e. elements of planning and operational man-
agement which the small conspicuously lack. 
8. Globalization as a factor of growing interdependence on the 
international stage 
In the first place it must be noted that globalization is a universal, as its very name 
implies, global process that takes place under the influence of strong autonomous 
impulses and nobody controls it. Unmanageability of globalization results from 
a larger number of circumstances and a few will be listed here. First, it is the 
consequence of a large number of factors, which is enough to make globalization 
unmanageable and uncontrollable. There are no such control centers that can 
establish control over arbitrarily large number of interfering factors, even if they 
were - as they are not - controllable. The sheer multiplicity of factors is sufficient 
to make the process of globalization predominantly autonomous, not subject to 
any kind of conscious orientation, including entities that are out of anyone’s han-
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dling capacity. However, they can be found under the influence of a large number 
of subjects, and this very multiplicity of influential factors must make globaliza-
tion unmanageable. With a plurality of factors, it is almost destined to be the 
subject of game theory and not a matter of algorithms oriented to calculation 
of unique optimum. With the impact of a large number of entities, the system 
as a whole is more likely to get stuck in a Nash equilibrium and inimitable B. 
Stojanović (2005, p. 135) had good reasons to emphasize that Nash equilibrium is 
not (general and systemic) an optimum.
There is another equally compelling reason contained in the fact that the tech-
nical progress is a basis and by far the most powerful force that drives and main-
tains a number of components of the globalization process. The development 
of technology is principally unpredictable and this unpredictability at the level 
of principles can be demonstrated at the most abstract philosophical level as it 
was done in an impressive and permanently amazing way by K. Pepper (1988, p. 
145-7). The argument is as deep as simple: if achievements of - always in the fu-
ture located - technical progress were predictable, it would not make sense, they 
would be known now, and there would be no need to talk about what the progress 
of technology will bring in the future. And what is not predictable certainly can-
not be manageable nor controllable. The third big reason of unmanageability of 
globalization consists of the fact that it is far from being just a technological phe-
nomenon and economic process; it is also the phenomenon of cultural conver-
gence, then the demographically relevant phenomenon of the security-relevant 
phenomenon, but beyond that it appears as a process of social evolution in the 
broadest sense of the word.
Societies have not developed institutional mechanisms through which they 
could direct and control complex processes in so many areas of social interaction, 
let alone those that would enable the control of globalization worldwide, that is to 
say at the level of a large number of very different entities with particularly differ-
entiated and often conflicting interests. Therefore, it seems amazingly, if not ab-
surd when J. Stiglitz in his recent article (2016) stresses that rules through which 
public policies are pursued “should include measures to tame globalization”, and 
especially striking is his judgment that “globalization is not the problem, but the 
way it was managed” (both quotes on p. 39, underlined Lj. M.). It seems that no 
one is immune to irrational claims and can hide behind the Nobel Prize. 
The implications of globalization trends are indeed numerous and somewhat 
immense. There is no doubt that the various observers would speak out in public 
with a variety of lists, and all of them could be meaningful and relevant. Here the 
first place will be taken probably by unavoidable fact that globalization by the 
logic of its definition increases - and it seems faster and more diverse - a network 
of international contacts, including striking interstate contacts. More contacts 
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mean more international interdependence and interaction, with the increase in 
the diversity of these international connections at the same time. This means that 
the development and current economic policies of some countries will increas-
ingly depend on what is happening and what is being done in other countries.
Thanks to technological advancements hegemons also have new opportuni-
ties to control those they dominate, but a general increase in the system on a 
planetary scale makes them harder to control because they are larger and more 
complex, so on that basis we should expect some weakening of subjects with great 
power over the less powerful entities. In any case, the growth of interdependence 
should be expected in two widely separated areas, which could be interpreted 
as the different levels where interdependence is established. There is one area of 
intermingling of real economic sizes, primarily multiplication and increase in 
trade flows including real labor mobility flows and, in particular, the capital. The 
second area consists of increasingly dense networking of the world using infor-
mation and communication links, and there is a rapid growth of opportunities 
for the transmission of control impulses and feedback on their effects in the field. 
Current trends in both large areas have resulted in strengthening mutual in-
fluence and integration of national economic policies, and thus the growth of 
constraints that impose governing control of the state concerned on each policy 
in its own economic-political field. Perhaps it is good to note that the interde-
pendences due to the momentum of globalization increase in the width and 
depth: in the width because the number of geographic areas increases, as well as 
the number of sectors which are becoming more firmly connected, and in depth 
because those relations, thanks to technology, are becoming more powerful and 
more effectively accomplished. 
9. Technologically conditioned structural changes as a factor of 
the decline in manageability and expansion of constraints on 
economic policy 
In addition to technologically conditioned enhancement of interconnectivity of 
management operations, the development of technology identifies the change of 
various economic constitutions and structures too - especially the capital mar-
ket, and to some extent the labor market - which inevitably and indeed strongly 
increases the interdependence of individual economies, and thus the relative rep-
resentation of exogenous dynamic impulses, including the controlling ones origi-
nating from abroad, at the expense of control range of operation of the domestic 
economic and political operations and directing potential of the corresponding 
institutionally formalized instrumentarium. In parallel with this change in the 
balance of driving and controlling impulses, there is certainly an increase, and 
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will continue to be along irreversibly established trend, in the number of range 
of management restrictions which are imposed on a given economy and its eco-
nomic policy outside economic and business system as institutional order.
We should recall, inter alia, the brain drain. Domestic economic policies will 
not be able for a long time as hard as ever to push equalization in the formation 
of incomes, so called compression of income as mentioned in recent times. There 
are many reasons why people educated at the top foreign universities returned 
regularly and with no exceptions to Serbia at the turn of the century, but there is 
one particularly important among them and that is the fact that a highly educated 
person had a salary above the general social average, and that the income ranges 
depending on the qualifications were disproportionately higher than it is the case 
today. It seems that such reckless egalitarian policy cannot have a long-term per-
spective; price of equalization is too high and when it becomes unbearable, there 
will be inevitable reversal. 
There are much stronger effects - and to a much greater extent they are im-
posed as control restrictions - of the growing international mobility of capital. 
What was previously a long, complicated and expensive procedure with signifi-
cant risks of not being successfully completed, today it is done by clicking on the 
computer keyboard. Never before has capital been as mobile on international 
routes as it is today. This means that one of the most powerful preoccupations of 
the economic policy is becoming an influence on capital flows. This influence is 
strongly emphasized on two grounds: the control activities should produce the 
maximum incentives for attracting capital flows generated abroad, and on the 
other hand they must devote maximum attention to efforts to keep the domestic 
capital exposed to the temptations of attraction of foreign environments, some-
how on its own territory. It almost means that the current economic policy has to 
adapt to the dictate of capital instead of setting ultimately against it and limit it, as 
it was the case until recently in the long economic history of the world. Pressed by 
necessity to uphold equity and to maintain it on its territory with the continuous 
improvement of environment, the economic policy loses its effectiveness once 
again on two grounds. First, the threat of capital going to the favorable climate 
generally weakens its effectiveness; and, secondly, possibility for concrete organi-
zations to leave, together with the capital that was invested in them imposes on 
economic policy a series of equally concrete constraints that are detailed enough 
to descend to the level of the individual, clearly identified companies.
Some visual impact has the growing tendency of creation of a densely woven 
network of international bilateral and multilateral agreements that by the logic 
of multilateral compliant consent given in advance limits the economic policy in 
many operations it previously operated freely. These agreements, as well as other 
forms of coordination of national public policies, act almost in width and depth: 
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in width by including in various forms and ways a growing number of countries, 
economic and other activities within and subjects that act as autonomous factors 
at the micro level, and in depth by increasing the intensity of these connections 
and making their rich composition more diverse. The network of these various 
arrangements is expanding rapidly and could be interpreted as a clearly visible 
aspect of the development of the world economy as a whole. These arrangements 
are far from being symmetrical; they are not such even in terms of power of 
partners included, or to the extent where some of them affect the nature and 
conditions of the arrangement. They can therefore be interpreted as formalized 
restrictions on economic policy whose space for the operation is being reduced 
on this basis too.
New time has brought a phenomenon that was previously hardly conceiv-
able. There is a competition between individual countries, and it is precisely in 
the area of economic policy. In attracting capital, and in providing conditions 
for more comfortable operation, the countries are trying to compete to attract as 
much capital as possible. Wherever it appears, the competition narrows space for 
maneuver of those involved. The same happens to economic policy: faced with 
competition from the outside, it is faced with a visible reduction in the number 
of options at its disposal. Although competition disciplines national economic 
policies in a way, it could not be said to be unconditionally useful and in the af-
firmative sense always effective.
Without going into details, the formulation and implementation of economic 
policy is not an area that, by its structure and functional properties, could be 
improved with competition. In this area all the standard functional deficiencies 
were identified and in the first half of the last century they were established as 
market defects, manifested to a far greater extent. In this part, the limited number 
of subjects is particularly important, their unequal power, strong impact between 
many of them and with the largest it is the establishment of a sort of monopoly 
situation with a large number of dominated followers; there is, finally, the absence 
of sound institutional basis for that “market” in the form of clearly defined and 
systematically protected property rights and contractual relations.
In recent years subsidizing FDI has become very popular, and this is “ex-
plained” by referencing to a similar practice in more or less all the surrounding 
countries. There are general theoretical bases for criticism of this practice, the 
criticism that fundamentally calls into question all that practice and competition, 
by proving that it is a single deformed “market” with the wrong (non-owner) 
basis. Competition compels countries to unrestrained concessions to foreign in-
vestors, who would, if it was a well-designed project, have an interest to invest 
without subsidies. And vice versa, if they were attracted by subsidies and did not 
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otherwise invest in these projects, the chances were that those would be unprofit-
able business ventures.
10. Restrictions on economic and other public policies based on 
threats to man’s natural environment 
One should not omit even relatively new but general, truly comprehensive factor 
of the general reduction in the scope of economic and development policy, which 
undoubtedly affects all countries - large and small, dominant and dominated, 
hegemons and subordinate associates - and that is the pollution of the atmos-
phere, and many others forms of environmental degradation that could impose 
themselves as a severe constraint to the whole world and all economic activities. 
Number of ways in which the environment is degraded and contaminated is very 
large and it increases in time, but they all have one fundamental characteristic 
and a global aspect which restrict economic activities and make them more ex-
pensive and less efficient. Natural conditions under which economic activities are 
carried out, “belong to” the whole mankind, and they are far from being defined 
in terms of clear property relations. Despite international efforts and repeated ac-
tions to limit pollution and preserve the natural habitat where humanity resides 
and works, the fact is that these valuable natural resources of the country are 
used by the economic operators in an unlimited and uncontrolled way, with no 
institutional mechanisms to regulate this usage and in particular, to limit it to the 
extent which will not endanger the future of mankind.
For example, the atmosphere and the wide expanse of ocean “belong” to the 
same extent to the countries A and B, and the country B may with its industry 
and traffic pollute the atmosphere or deplete fisheries resources on the wide seas 
more than the country A. The global institutional order has no mechanisms to 
ensure that the country B compensates the damage the country A nor the mecha-
nisms that would make the country B save these valuable collective resources. If 
the mess in “possession” and the use of resources last a little longer, Saks warns 
(2014, passim especially p.32-91, 69-81 and 478-84), that the very survival of 
mankind with all creations of civilization accumulated in its long history could be 
endangered. From the enormous pressure, unprecedented in the overall history – 
for the mankind to survive - powerful constraints on the economic policies of all 
countries will arise, but there is no doubt that smaller countries will be exposed 
to greater risks than the large and powerful, and in particular greater than the 
risks of the hegemons. 
Surprisingly, there is a large number of dimensions in which current eco-
nomic activities and their development trajectories affect the environment and 
generalized resources whose property rights are not defined - and cannot be over 
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many - and which are subject to the disorganized, uncoordinated and uncon-
trolled, for now uncontrollable exploitation of all countries. The essence of the 
problem is the fact that various countries to a very different extent exploit these 
resources, which are mutual only because their usage has not been legally formal-
ized. Some of these resources are used intensely and ruthlessly, which affects all. 
In the current development developed countries have much more benefited from 
them, and thus far more exploited them, and today the underdeveloped ones, 
acting with natural aspirations to make up their developmental delay as quickly 
as possible, cannot do that without engaging as big polluters and as entities that 
exploit other unregulated resources. It is a source of great international tensions 
and a potential cause of the devastating inter-state conflicts. These tensions are 
today imposed on the economic policies of countries as direct constraints and as 
sources and generators of many, sometimes multiply mediated additional restric-
tions.
The number of fronts where the natural environment is degraded, termino-
logically specified here as dimensions of the impact of economic activity on the 
human environment, in a really dramatic tones is mentioned in the latest, already 
quoted book by J. Sachs (2014, p. 38-9, 173-201). Although it says, in overtones 
that become recognizably apocalyptic, that all numerous warnings of planetary 
hazards of more intense distortion of man’s natural habitat are deprived of any 
real basis and that they represent one’s artificially forced and from objective truth 
drastically removed myth, inspired by real motives of obtaining such abundant 
funds for supporting research, it must be noted that his analysis seems truly dis-
turbing. Referring to the extensive literature, to the extent that it is largely treated 
as a separate new discipline, Sachs informs on nine fronts where serious dam-
age to the environment is accumulated. These are (1) air pollution with aerosols 
which has not been quantified yet with the required precision, (2) chemical pol-
lution (also not quantified yet), (3) climate change, (4) acidification, i.e. increas-
ing the acidity of the oceans, (5) reduction of ozone in the stratosphere, (6a) the 
nitrogen cycle, (6b) phosphorus cycle (whereby 6a and 6b relate to the satura-
tion of solid soil with nitrogen and phosphorous compounds that increasingly 
limit the fertility of land and have devastating influence on the quantity and the 
quality of agricultural production), (7) depletion of fresh water, (8) repurpos-
ing the land use, particularly accelerated deforestation with severe damage to the 
environment on the broadest, global scale and, finally, (9) the accelerated loss of 
biodiversity with disappearance of a large number of plants and animal species. 
The attention should be drawn to the insufficiently predictable but followed by 
a number of deteriorations the synergy of these multiple damages. Thus, e.g., air 
pollution with aerosols interacts with climate change and the re-appropriation of 
land use, nitrogen and phosphorus cycles with other forms of chemical pollution, 
and ocean acidification with a sharp decline in biodiversity. 
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Recognizing that these are serious threats to man’s natural environment, but 
also to the habitat of other living beings, it is obvious that it indicates the need for 
a set of large, interconnected and time-uninterruptable, continuous actions that 
should fit into a coherent policy on the world level. And for that, as well as for 
any other policy the right institutional infrastructure is necessary with the right 
economic and system machinery. However, it is still in its initial, quite rudimen-
tary form of development, drastically lagging behind the real changes that have 
loomed largely as a threat to the world economy. 
This is another, this time perhaps the most striking, example of unequal 
alarming pace of development of certain areas of social life on a planetary scale. 
The technology has been taking huge steps, imposing itself as a striking phenom-
enon over the past nearly three centuries of more recent history, and institutional 
infrastructure as abstractly defined and understood in the broadest sense the or-
ganization of society, lags disturbingly and greatly behind this impressive expan-
sion. Since they always catch the attention in many areas of human activity, the 
novelties generated in the technological and operational development of organi-
zation, are not accompanied by training of the society to effectively manage those 
novelties. One only needs to recall the tumultuous expansion in the creation of 
new instruments in the capital markets and that monetary and financial theory 
has not reached the point in its development where mechanisms resulting from 
the creation of new instruments at least could be understood and interpreted, not 
to speak of expedient and rational enough management.
Restrictions on economic policy arising from environmental threats to hu-
manity and the relative slowness in developing management mechanisms are 
easy to detect and as if they can define and characterize themselves. The first 
large group of constraints derives from the general underdevelopment, that is, 
the delays in development, institutional constitutions which could be managed 
by the new creations in technology and operationally understood organization. 
This restriction on the development of the necessary institutional machinery is 
derived from the two other, deeper and more difficult to surmount constraints, 
and it is a deficit in available knowledge and antagonism of interests with still 
unknown mechanisms of its possible adjustment. This is a broad front of so far 
almost insurmountable difficulties where both large and small countries, hegem-
ons and those dominated have been severely pressed, but there are compelling 
reasons for the expectation that under these adverse circumstances small players 
will suffer more than greater players on the world political stage. Another broad 
group of constraints arises from the increasing pressure of environmental threats 
that is powerful enough to cause serious efforts to limit such threats or at least to 
alleviate them, but these efforts necessarily involve far-reaching harmonization of 
national public policies and their constraints. 
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If the world is increasingly technologically connected, there is a clear need for 
strong relations in the management structures too and public policies governed 
by and through them. Adjustments will have to be so radical and far-reaching 
that they will inevitably be accompanied by insufficiently predictable turbulences 
and, because of them, in forms that will largely follow and reflect them, by the 
corresponding tensions and conflicts. It is well-known that in the potential and 
actual conflicts, small countries pay more than large countries. 
11. Contradictions of globalization and difficulties of harmonizing 
differentially affected, that is favored interests 
It is well known that large changes are polyvalent, complicated, unpredictable 
and, of course, unmanageable. Polanyi (2003, especially p. 95-6 and 270-1) de-
voted many pages of his famous book to turmoil brought by major changes, but 
also a kind of cognitive limitations and misconceptions concerning their causes 
and consequences. As one of the biggest changes, and such that engulfed virtu-
ally the entire planet, globalization is unique in multitude of its consequences and 
particularly distinctive after the multitude of its aspects. It is understandable that 
with so many consequences and reflections in so many aspects globalization has 
to be contradictory. 
It should be obvious and again understandable, that globalization gives a huge 
mass of net positive effects at the level of the world as a whole. There was a mas-
sive reorganization of resources; a huge mass of resources was diverted to the 
superior alternatives, and the opportunities for a much improved evaluation of 
resources were created through a global and far-reaching restructuring of world 
trade flows even in the constellations where the necessary institutional condi-
tions were not provided for the mobility of resources.
It is natural and expected that, in parallel with the adoption of the huge ben-
efits for the world as a whole, globalization brought to some areas and some sec-
tors painful and expensive adaptations or even apparently large losses. That is why 
there is a heavy problem of an objective assessment of valorization in the situation 
characteristic for a multitude of different and often opposing effects, both posi-
tive and, locally and sporadically, negative. It requires good analytical soundness 
and calm, mature reasoning to bring an objective and prudent judgment with a 
multitude of such different and contradictory consequences of globalization. It is 
certainly inappropriately unjustified to lament over the growing inequalities in 
developed countries without in-depth examination of the institutional causes of 
such emphasized income differentiation. Focusing on the consequences without 
plunging into the causes has never been a good research strategy. What if at the 
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level of the cause nothing can be found and argued reasonably, but in the field 
of results there is quite a lot of what is for some or even for many controversial? 
In any case, selective and one-sided lamentation over thirty years of stagna-
tion of operating income in the United States, with a noticeable increase in in-
equality, must be qualified as inappropriate if it is shaped with the prediction of 
much bigger positive fact that nearly forty-year turbulent development of China 
brought to several billion world mass far above the average growth rate of indi-
vidual and totally calculated income, and thus brought the decline in imbalances 
in the spectacular scale on a planetary scale. This, of course, does not mean that 
it is advisable to ignore the significant political and social tensions in developing 
countries (in a recent interview M. Panić impressively explained that Trump was 
voted by angry people in the US; it may be added that they are unjustifiably angry 
because of far-reaching and irreversible consequences of objectively conditioned 
flows of globalization, whose natural component is the quest of entrepreneurs for 
large reserves of cheaper labor, and that they equally unjustified accuse the rul-
ing establishment of what had to happen in those circumstances, due to the strict 
conditionality and obvious unmanageability).
Turning to the topic of this text, internal social tensions and violent political 
convulsions will impose on the US foreign policy, both economic and other pub-
lic policies, radical restrictions, and the restrictions on the policy of this power 
acting as a hegemon will produce strong effects on a wide group of other coun-
tries, imposing itself on the public policies of these countries as almost equally 
severe restrictions. From these highly probable further breakdowns in public pol-
icies, which are essentially based on the pressure of the labor world in the United 
States to get protection from foreign competition, nothing good can be expected 
(Bagvati 2008, p. 263). We can expect the protectionist measurements and partial 
canceling of painfully obtained liberalization of foreign economic flows. 
This is likely to lead to a well-known deformation so many times recorded at 
the level of individual countries and on the world scale: some large social groups, 
possibly internationally defined, will be protected and economically assisted with 
globally and dramatically demonstrated damages which by their volume far ex-
ceed the gains of those groups obtained in harsh political confrontations. It could 
be one of the typical scenarios in which minorities are able to fight for their fi-
nancial interests with a lot of damage and irreparable loses caused to majorities. 
The world is far from perfect configurations that are presented in the theoreti-
cal models: Bagvati (2008, p. 267-8) cites examples of vulgar political arithmetic 
which at the international level overcomes the rational and attractive economic 
calculation for the entire international economic system, and manages to mobi-
lize even perversely customized (quasi) scientific theories in defense of particular 
interests.
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12. Institutionalization of international relations and  
conditioned flows
To have an international commodity, financial and, in particular, capital flows, 
avoiding major turmoil, some kind of order is needed. Ranking is the state of re-
lations that allows at least some minimum of harmonization of flows and policies, 
their regularity and thus the legality at the level of major international systems 
that precisely provides information signals and control instruments at least for 
the minimum necessary for guidance and, again, at least to some extent, provides 
predictability of economic trends in their supporting tendencies. Without certain 
elements of the order the world could not function even with that modest meas-
ure of organization which it works with in the current constellations of notori-
ously burdened numerous imperfections and structural discrepancies. Ranking 
is built and developed with systemic effects of everything that is happening in 
the field of most widely understood international economic and then political 
relations. 
This is the point where we must define two separate concepts necessary to 
consider the order. The terms are systematism and system creation. Systematism 
refers to the elements of the order, spontaneously and unexpectedly emerged as 
a result and the outcome of business transactions which could be performed nei-
ther on domestic nor on international plan if there were no mechanisms for their 
mutual adjustment. Searching for modalities of more effective use of resources, 
economic entities search for ways of linking their transactions with the transac-
tions of others, which is the way, with any deviations and unexpected twists, to 
the necessary extent - necessary for the economic activity to be continuously per-
formed - the relations between supply and demand are regulated.
Each group of transactions includes elements of systematism, but it is obvi-
ous that the big players contribute more to the establishment of systematism. 
Systematism is, therefore, spontaneous or collateral result of transactions both 
at the domestic and international level, but these latter are, on the whole and 
in terms of individual elements of these heterogeneous groups, larger and more 
far-reaching. They also face greater challenges in establishing the components 
of the order in a far more extensive and complex economic systems. The effects 
are much stronger in terms of systematism when it comes to larger players and 
more extensive transactions they perform regularly. Elements of systematism oc-
cur as direct consequences of these large transactions, but also because they all 
require adequate preparations where information collected during these prepa-
rations serve as the basis for the adjustments that inherently occur as elements 
of necessary order. Many entities of smaller and more modest scope adapt to 
big decisions of major economic entities, and these adjustments are interwoven 
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into the order that takes on the properties of the system on a higher stage. The 
system can be defined as a plurality of conformations that generate information 
necessary for the harmonization of decisions and allow the activation of motiva-
tional structures needed to launch and sustain the adjustments through which 
that coordination of decision takes place. The end result of this information and 
motivational feature of the system is, even if it is not perfect and only partially 
established, the order predictably seen as a proper arrangement of fitting parts in 
wider entities which operate based on previously perceptive legality.
Systematic arrangement of any configuration of economic flows is not a bina-
ry characteristic, i.e. it is not a property which can be said to be either represented 
or absent in only two logically possible variants. On the contrary, it is a feature 
which, at the abstract level, as well as at the level of lively economic reality, varies 
over a wide range, which owns and is logically defined through defining the fea-
ture of continuity: the observed constellation can be found on this wide scale in an 
infinite number of positions. For the purpose of accuracy it should be specified - 
resorting to a well-known mathematical concept - there are many of these posi-
tions in the continuum. Systematic arrangement may, therefore, be understood 
as a continuous variable, which in a given interval can take as many positions as 
there are real numbers in one interval of the coordinate system.
Systematism of economic decision-making processes produces, therefore, an 
initial, generally rudimentary order out of which new needs for further and more 
complete institutional construction arise. In other words, there is a need for for-
malized and official institutions. It turns out that without such institutions, many 
adjustments in terms of coordination are not carried out, many tendencies of 
future developments cannot be anticipated reliably enough, but many potential 
and actual conflicts remain without mechanisms for constructive dismissal. This 
is the level at which state actions are activated in the field of a number of public 
policies, the actions directed at more permanent regulation of economic relations 
and inspired by the desire to build the stable, discernible and versatile mecha-
nisms to create a sort of hard core of the institutional order, sufficiently compre-
hensive and robust to include numerous entities of economic developments in a 
longer perspective, and also to provide opportunities and interest to fit into their 
broad frames because of better coordination of decision-making and possible 
directing of economic processes. 
This is the point at which spontaneously arisen systematism turns into sys-
tem creation, i.e. in a very wide group of measures and actions that public au-
thorities take toward building and developing a systematic institutional order. It 
is a planned development of order both at the national and international level, 
where the latter is more hazardous and less predictable because of the notori-
ous and often stated circumstances that at the international level there has not 
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been (yet) structured world state. System creation is such a broad set of activi-
ties that it is certainly immense, and especially unpredictable in its successive 
stages. Although there are many activities through which the system is devel-
oped and structured, they are still specific to a far-reaching important way. It 
has a multitude of organized activities, which, due to theoretically understood 
attribute of publicity, in general, cannot be spontaneously performed through the 
operation of free, institutionally unlimited market or alternative and spontaneous 
mechanisms. Institutions necessary for modern, including any, market economy 
are formed in a spontaneous and organized way, and the entity engaged in this 
organized segment of the establishment and development of institutions must, of 
course, be a state. At the international level it is the country again, but this time, 
a plurality of states that with coordinated actions build and develop coordination 
structures with the aim of at least partial and approximate harmonization of na-
tional public policies. 
The standard recommendation to entrust the construction of the institutional 
order to highly organized state and its institutions misses the point and relevance 
despite the obvious fact that this order has the attribute of the publicity in terms 
of fiscal theory (non-excludability and uncompetitiveness). Recommendation 
in its original form remains inapplicable with respect to the institutions at the 
global level intended to regulate relations between entities belonging to differ-
ent countries, and to create the necessary order in the interaction between the 
countries. World state does not exist, and a cluster of international organizations 
under the auspices of the United Nations or indirectly related to them, is only in a 
rudimentary stage of development and it is far from the world government. This 
means that the development of institutions that should govern international eco-
nomic relations is significantly different from building institutions at the national 
level and for the purpose of regulating the internal economic flows. International 
institutions are not developed to the extent to which domestic institutions are 
developed, and the process of their construction is more galling, long lasting, 
harder to predict and burdened by major hazards. 
The construction of the international institutional order by its nature involves 
more entities-countries, and there is always open, permanent question of the 
scope and participation of individual countries in building order which by the 
logic of its purpose should oblige and harmonize in numerous activities all par-
ticipants in the international interactions. There is a variety of options here, as 
well as domestically, in the structuring and developing the institutional order in 
many stages and at many points, but one can hardly find solutions to which there 
is no discernible alternative. Different variations of particular solutions within 
this large order are attractive in a different way to some entities, and this dif-
ferentiation of interests formed in relation to individual variants has to produce 
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tensions between the participants in this complicated and hazardous job, even 
those which give rise to latent and open conflicts.
Rich, for decades and centuries accumulated, international experience shows 
that the share of individual subjects in building the order which will direct and 
synchronize both their decisions and actions is prominently varied and strikingly 
uneven. Power emerges as the key word in this context, and there is a large num-
ber of entities, whose multilateral regulatory systems, including coordination of 
decisions of a large number of countries, were built by others. These others are 
easy to identify: they are the countries that entered the processes of economic 
development before others and they are in the group of economically most devel-
oped countries. These are at the same time the countries that are in a dimension 
of power superior to others and that could not have failed to build institutions 
in the sphere of international regulatory system according to their needs and 
inspirations. Without any risk it can be a priori postulated that the international 
order in all its empirically known variants suited better some countries more 
than others and that it even was systematically better adapted to more developed 
and more powerful than to those that entered the development race late or lost 
significant intervals of historical time in Proust’s way.
However, it can be said in a sense that those who contributed more and were 
more involved in its construction, have the right to more benefits from the ex-
isting regulatory order, but it is obvious that this laconic statement does not 
eliminate misunderstandings nor tensions. As with individuals who as individual 
members of a community have their own idiosyncratic ideas about justice, in the 
group of states there appear different views on how individual elements of the 
international order should look like and how they should be reformed in order 
to eliminate “injustice” . As in the construction of the domestic order, here too, 
due to the conflicting interests appear serious, by the implications far-reaching 
political problems, and appropriate restrictions are a big reason for the large - in 
some constellations a word drastic will not be excessive - discrepancies of the 
actual order in relation to a number of normative conceptions about what kind it 
should be in order to be fairer and more efficient.
13. Scope of actions in system creation and  
associated constrains and obstacles
In all human endeavors the order is a factor of the coherence of a number of ac-
tions, functional framework for their coordination and a valuable potential for 
increasing efficiency. Just as globalization, accompanied by the liberalization of 
economic processes and corresponding flows, at the level of large units, it un-
doubtedly brings valuable individual effects and raises the whole (world!) system 
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predictably to a higher level of efficiency. However, this is only one aspect of 
establishing the order, which is inherent, and of systematism and system creation 
as defined in the previous section. On the other hand, there is a completely dif-
ferent aspect of the distribution of these positive effects on the individual entities 
in the given system. 
Regardless of the positive overall balance with no exceptions - positive at least 
in the long run – there are always groups of entities to which this general im-
provement does not bring proportionate benefits, and even those that are in a 
position of direct losers. Among subjects that find themselves in the position of 
a loser, or just in a position of disproportionate, below-average winner, too often 
there are those that have sufficient political power to block changes aimed at rais-
ing the overall desirable effects in the process of institutional adaptation. Just as 
in analogous constellations there are groups that are sufficiently powerful to im-
pose specific patterns of economic and system development that brings consid-
erable effects only to them, for which reason they are clearly situated at the side 
of recognizable particular interests, but these selectively produced benefits are 
achieved at the cost of much greater losses at the level of relevant unit. These are 
the proverbial political constraints on economic and system changes that are easy 
to show they are desirable and welcomed, according to purely economic criteria.
And this is the context in which small, and thus insufficiently powerful coun-
tries often find themselves in the position of a loser or an entity which partici-
pates in the general improvements less than proportionally. It is easy to discern 
the options that are available to them. Since they do not have the power neces-
sary to reverse these adverse trends to institution-building, the only thing left for 
them is to accept them as exogenously given changes and adapt in an optimal 
way. Attempts of the small and insufficiently powerful countries to resist the main 
changes backed by powerful interests - cannot be fruitful in any better variant, 
but in a worse they are subject to retaliatory actions of more powerful entities, 
while the consequences of such typical retaliations assume all substantial features 
of punishments for “unconstructive” behavior. 
The imperatives of rational behavior will direct the small to minimize dam-
age if there is no maximization of some positive results, but this is better than 
the criminal attacks that the large can cause to the small in many situations. The 
small and helpless, deprived of this important choice - typically are suppressed 
in a position to choose between unfavorable options. It is good not to forget that 
even in this position there are choices, that rational strategy is a better variant 
than the other, i.e. optimal, and that pragmatic adjustment gives uneven favora-
ble outcomes of confrontations and conflicts with more powerful entities, which 
crowd all their realistically diagnosed environment, compared to the small and 
weak operators on the international scene. 
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The liberalization of international economic relations is an important form of 
adaptation and development of institutional order in this area, the form in which 
underdeveloped and economically, and even politically insufficiently powerful 
countries often give resistance and increase the tension and friction in generally 
difficult and hazardous process of removing installed barriers by the state to in-
ternational trade, especially to the movement of certain production factors. It is 
known that developing countries have greater number of better maintained pro-
tectionist measures and that, because of the actual or presumed impact of liber-
alization, they make more difficult to establish unified and equally applicable the 
modes of trade and other forms of economic cooperation. Poor countries, to the 
extent of their limited power, hinder, therefore, the liberalization of international 
economic relations. More powerful entities in these interactions, as the initia-
tors of the release of economic trends, tolerate this inhibitory activity, primarily 
because developing countries are not abundant markets and because commodity 
flows in their trade are anyway mostly focused on exchanges between the devel-
oped (Bagvati 2008, p. 272). Therefore, they are not particularly affected by the 
high tariff protection in less developed countries.
For the same reason, developing countries were able for long to continue with 
their protectionist policy even in the increasingly intense activities of the inter-
national coordination of national economic policies, which can be viewed as a 
specific form of globalization as well as a relatively new variant of internationally 
oriented system creation. Thus, the lack of the ability of the small and insuffi-
ciently powerful to limit or block the policy of coordination of national policies, 
as well as the release of the most widely understood economic relations and the 
two generated flows, shows as ultimately desirable and noticeably productive in 
terms of increasing development effects. Like many other categories of economic 
operators, small countries are faced with a typical contradiction of short-term 
and long-term consequences of certain institutional changes. In addition, sig-
nificant long-term benefits can be expected with the acceptance of the inevita-
ble short-term sacrifices that can be interpreted as another name for generalized 
costs seen as everything countries must give up for the sake of significant long-
term improvements. 
This conflict of interest seen in different time dimensions is beyond doubt and 
produces effects both internally and internationally. The consequences are tangi-
ble and real in spite of the fact that the conflict itself is often based on mispercep-
tions and more problematic interpretations of real economic interests. It is not 
only about the interests of individual countries but also about their associations 
established on various grounds and formally arranged in a series of strikingly 
different ways. The limited power of the undeveloped is shown as a kind of ad-
vantage, especially since the potentials of institutional changes are often not val-
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ued realistically and that in the absence of high-quality expertise, much of what 
is favorable is qualified as unfavorable. Insufficiency of scientific knowledge and 
expertise here too appears as a nuisance, and the development of science in this 
field can provide greater benefit than it is in most commonly encountered con-
texts recognized and scientifically explained. That the world is an imperfect place 
is perhaps most clearly seen in situations where conflicts of interest arise due to 
misinterpretation of the expected changes and the inability to assess reasonably 
and realistically their real effects.
With all the misunderstandings caused by oversights and direct errors in the 
assessment of the possible effects of liberalization and strengthening of the order 
within developing countries, their inhibitory effect on the development of world 
institutions remains, as it has just been pointed out, because of their limited pow-
er, certainly limited itself. Much greater threat to the normative recommended 
institutional development occurs in developed countries and in those relevant 
for general system at the national level, and it is due to previously pointed differ-
entiated impact of globalization and its institutions on individual powerful strata 
within developed societies. Moving companies to the countries with cheap and 
abundant labor force, then changes in the structure of foreign trade in terms of 
increasing the share in cheaper foreign imports at the expense of domestic pro-
duction, produces strong pressures on the world of labor in developed countries, 
but also leads to political reactions that are likely to change the behavior of coun-
tries in the delicate business of developing institutions that should govern inter-
national economic cooperation. In the US, for example, there are strong protec-
tionist tendencies, and newly elected President D. Trump announced sanctions 
for the companies that transfer their operations to the countries with (visible!) 
lower production costs. There are few political proclamations that are in a drastic 
conflict with economic theory such as this one.
This seems to suggest a fierce battle of the country with the business world 
and vigorous combating of the processes that have greatly increased the effective-
ness of the economy globally: as if outsourcing and off-shoring will be drastically 
reduced, and somewhere the line will be literally broken, with great damage to 
the economy of the world as a whole, even to the economy of the countries where 
these restrictive measures will be undertaken. This would be an example of re-
gression in economic policy and institutional building, the regression that would 
be initiated and maintained by the developed countries and that would strike hard 
the whole world in the long run, especially the underdeveloped countries. Less 
powerful countries often find themselves in the role of the collateral damage of 
great actions that are undertaken by the developed countries under different, of-
ten illegitimate pressures. Among most socially harmful consequences of often 
perverse directions of the activities of the country are certainly those that stem 
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from its instrumentalization in the service of particular commercial interest, 
when in the elementary static sense conditions for the efficient allocation of re-
sources are tremendously being damaged and the system is drastically falling far 
below the level of its objective technological and resource opportunities. 
The lack of a global institutional system that would have universal significance 
for all countries and all businesses is particularly strongly manifested through 
various forms of unfair competition: stricter standards in terms of environmental 
issues, more consistent respect for workers’ rights, more persistent implementa-
tion of a number of standards in increasing and maintaining safety in work pro-
cesses and beyond ... these are the areas where some countries unduly gain com-
petitive advantage only because these standards are not respected and because 
these illegitimate paths ensure lower costs in production and distribution of their 
products. The introduction of a general system of norms and standards, as well 
as institutions with literally international extents of regulatory impacts, would 
improve the world as a whole, though, the resistance could be expected from the 
poorest countries because of the evident fact that the adjustment to standards 
requires commitment and resources, which less developed countries lack.
14. The strategy of small countries in the institutional and structural 
adjustments through interactions with large countries
Irremovable feature of geopolitical and economic reality is the existence of the 
large and powerful alongside the small and far less powerful state entities. The pe-
culiarity of this reality is the constant and unpredictable dynamic change in pow-
er relations. There is no doubt that globalization cannot equally affect all coun-
tries and that its differentiated operation changes the power relations between 
the countries. These relations change with the change and possible improvement 
of the international institutional order in the sphere of economic relations, and 
different effects of certain countries on the directions and pace of change of that 
order within it result in the institutional changes which are far better reflected in 
some countries than in the other. 
There is a predictable but potentially destructive conflict between the tradi-
tional national aspirations and beliefs incorporated into deep value orientations 
which have their powerful source in the historical memory and collective memo-
ries, and pragmatic imperatives to realize, in a complicated modern world, with 
unequal entities and changing relations in their power, always current practical 
goals whose realization is a condition for the economic prosperity and welfare 
of the people. The gap between what is axiologically sublime and national prior-
ity, on the one hand, and what is important pragmatically and efficient in ac-
tions in the daily realization of these high goals, on the other hand, is a source of 
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mass frustration and hardships. Although varying in time, this gap is a source of 
constant pressures on inflexible and poorly flexible system of values  and secular 
national aspirations. The logic of pragmatism drives to the use of funds that for 
a large number of citizens do not seem to be compatible with large and often 
permanent, historical evolution of consecrated goals, and striving to do what the 
masses perceive as sublime and realized primarily with appropriate objectives of 
the agreed funds - usually leads to defeat and new, this time obviously different 
mass disappointment.
In the world of predominant power of major entities, whose vision of the fu-
ture, especially of the institutional movements, is very different from what small 
countries want to achieve with regard to their long history of conditional value 
orientations and national aspirations, it is not easy to stay consistent with na-
tional priority and at the same time effective in its affirmation and permanent 
but consistent confirmation. For the small it is a great temptation with their large 
and sharply differentiated objectives to cling to their century long traditions and 
to find themselves in conflict with others who see their future differently. As par-
ticularly hazardous there appear variously shaped perspectives of living together 
and more or less concerted actions. Different and conflicting visions of the politi-
cal and economic future and crossed interests in the set of institutional options 
that are naturally contained in these visions, have great potential for conflicts, 
but experience shows that often, and typically, they lead to more or less expressed 
actual conflicts.
In these conflicts small countries are handicapped in a predictable and ob-
vious way because the prospects for the realization of national aspirations are 
shown as strikingly unsatisfactory. To make this realization lead to at least mod-
est results, there is an unavoidable need for customizing to preferences and poli-
cies of the major players. In order to succeed in the realization of interests, one 
should closely monitor the interests of the large and even anticipate their evolu-
tion, understand these interests as limitations and carefully fit into them. Small 
countries by their size and their modest power inevitably and quite predictably 
face the situation that makes their adjustment to the (economic) political priori-
ties of the big players difficult: the number of entities that are more powerful than 
them and whose interests should be considered as the potential restrictions is 
higher - at elementary arithmetic logic - than the appropriate number of larger 
and more powerful entities. Therefore, they have to count with a large number 
of constraints related to other participants in the geopolitical interactions, and 
above all the limits are more widely structured and restrictive. Identifying these 
constraints and successful positioning in relation to them impose themselves as 
a big cognitive problem and the task that requires a lot of refined expertise, and 
this is the element the small players strikingly lack.
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An important part of this pragmatic adaptation is the identification of action 
areas where interests coincide with interests of the large or at least they are in 
tolerable harmony in relation to the interests of the powerful. Not all the interests 
are conflicting and a part of the economic-political and wider political maturity 
consists of finding and specially emphasizing, with the efforts to realize them to 
the highest degree, these, at least compatible if not completely, matched interests.
The imperative of successful national policy, adjusting its implementation to 
important international standards and relations, is difficult to pass on the internal 
political scene. The platform which at least for pragmatic reasons is moving away 
from what is national and is leaning on international factors hardly gets electoral 
support. It is difficult to get an affirmative interpretation in the later historical 
analysis too: it took Prince Paul long to get as complimentary treatment as he 
deserved. When the managerial elite turns to the national values  and strictly lo-
cal electoral preferences of voters in the election programs in order to achieve 
their political aspirations, it is very likely that there will be multiple conflicts with 
international environment of the country still dominated by strong players with 
their always different political preferences. There appear in international terms 
the hazards of major conflicts that in the recent, as well as in the old history, were 
so often realized. That is what exactly happened in our region where the small, 
with less power, engaged in conflicts with the more powerful than they are. The 
outcomes of such conflicts are also known: the small came out as defeated, they 
suffered powerful shocks and substantial losses in the conflict which they other-
wise would not, and the final solution reached as the result of the conflict turned 
out to be significantly worse than it would be if the logic of inequality was re-
spected and the conflict was avoided with farsighted strategy and skillful tactics.
Adjusting to more remarkable (economic) political priorities of dominant en-
tities is the subject of, therefore, rational policy of small countries, which is im-
plied. Neither these propositions, nor many others which in the first perception 
have an imperative character, have absolute applicability, and their indirect, less 
visible subtext should be noted. There are many actions and broadly understood 
policies of the small that do not cause punitive retributions of the stronger even 
though they do not fit fully into their strategic calculations or even directly get 
into a conflict with a number of their plans and related activities. The sanctions 
that would be introduced by the large as a form of punishing the small and as pre-
ventive elimination of future similar undesirable behavior obviously have their 
costs and they will certainly be avoided if they fail to pass successfully a kind of 
analysis of relations between benefits and costs. Sanctions that are expensive in 
relation to the assessment of benefit from behavior modification of the smaller 
participants in international interactions will be certainly avoided by the large. 
48
Acta Economica, Volume XV, No. 26 / June 2017 9 – 54
There specific spaces are opened, a kind of cracks, through which the small can 
pull their distinctive policies with impunity even if the large do not like them.
The chances for such maneuvers are much more analytically and in-depth 
explained in the contemporary theory of conflicts that has grown into a separate 
scientific discipline (Shelling 1973) and whose insight into the non-frontal nature 
of the prevailing majority of conflicts - i.e. such configuration in which, in ad-
dition to directly conflicting elements occur those with the conflict which is far 
milder or even non-existent, and even those with the identification of agreement 
of interests – is one of the most important and cognitively most abundant find-
ings (p. 4-5, 17 ). Great point in the thesis on the potential and actual relativism 
of conflicts is the message that for the promotion of self-interest the best areas of 
their matching or at least a certain conformity with the interests of the dominant 
entities on the international stage, and then finding that conflicts are not neces-
sarily configuration with the character of zero-sum games, on the contrary, are 
very complex but possible situations in which two potentially conflicting parties 
may, with respect to their objective functions, realize significant gains. 
Another opportunity to relativize the constraints arising from the interests 
and policies of big entities occurs in situations of tense confrontation of large 
dominant players (cold war!) when establishing certain precarious, never reliable 
enough nor sufficiently stable equilibrium in which the weights can easily out-
weigh to one or to the other side and in which small additional forces, those that 
can be produced by the entities of the small power, receive a relatively high value. 
However, to successfully perform such maneuvers - those that are accompanied 
by high costs of retribution and those taking place on the edge of a fragile balance 
between the major powers - a lot of knowledge, operational skills and luck are 
necessary. Small countries generally lack all these elements. For small countries 
the most dangerous combination is the one of major disturbances in relations, 
which the large believe are significant, and the relatively low costs of retaliatory 
intervention whose purpose is preserving the credibility of the previously issued 
threats. These threats are variants of operationalization of zero tolerance of dis-
ruptive actions of small players and, even more, enterprises directed at preventing 
similar “deviant behavior” in the future.
Small participants in international events can be perceived and estimated as 
challengers of unwanted disruptions in relations that govern trends in the broad-
er world context. Significant deviations in behavior and policies of the less pow-
erful participants in the global events are reduced to distinctive forms of disrup-
tive behavior that could roughly be categorized into two groups. The first group 
includes behavior that directly infringes upon the interests of stronger entities in 
the international arena or, again, directly impedes the realization of actions that 
are important to them. The second group includes behavior again perceived as 
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deviant, which is in conflict with applicable international semi system, i.e. with 
partial order which evolutionarily grew or was constructively created with mul-
tiple and often repeated moves of a large number of entities, where again those 
more powerful contributed considerably more to the construction of the semi 
system. It goes without saying that this semi system is far from being completed, 
but on a broader scale, and even on a planetary scale, it provides a valuable coor-
dinating organization with the beneficial effects of maintaining a certain order, 
the mutual predictability of actions and behaviors and on that basis the essential 
increase in efficiency in relation to the regime in which there would be no such 
coordination of actions.
Strikes on order and violation of the existing built semi systems are seen in the 
international community as serious offenses and as a rule provoke punitive reac-
tions. This is not particularly surprising since the general benefits of the interna-
tional semi systems are very good; they have the character of a public good, they 
possess an intriguing particularity that deviation from their formalized orders is 
very attractive as long as most of the other participants adhere to implied rules of 
the semi system (one should remember that it was very tempting to increase pro-
duction and reduce the price in the international cartel of oil producers, where 
the deviant policy is also here attractive as long as all others keep to their mutual 
agreement!) and that such deviations have infectious potential: when they start 
avoiding rules, others will simply be forced to do the same. The importance of 
preserving and further developing semi systems in international relations, par-
ticularly those economic, stems from the fact that in the long run they bring sig-
nificant positive effects to all entities on the world stage, including of course the 
small and the second-class subjects in terms of available power.
Permanent and almost unresolvable problem is that the small, often due to 
deficient expertise, fail to see their long-term benefits properly and fully, but the 
problem is also that discount rate at which future benefits seem commensurable 
with the current in small and developing countries is far greater and there is con-
siderably less willingness and ability to hold to that future improvements. On the 
other hand, the large have a special motivation for the defence and preservation 
of semi systems because they undoubtedly contributed more to their develop-
ment and because they treat them almost as a result of its specific investment 
during long periods in the past.
15. Conclusion: between the pledged mission and political pragmatics 
In the previous section we highlighted a fundamental characteristic of the tradi-
tionally engaged nation committed to major and fixed value commitments in the 
long-term, whose historical memory and collective memory show over-standard 
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stability and which are determined in their political behavior to a large extent 
by the peculiarity of their social consciousness. It is a kind of national mission, 
highly valued by  the vast majority of the population and which is in the collec-
tive perception raised to the level of mythical consecrated sanctuary. Due to their 
durability and inflexibility, these determinations as a determinant of the mass 
behavior make this behavior conspicuously different from the behavior of other 
societies. It is difficult to reconcile with the patterns of behavior which are preva-
lent in today’s world. Such value orientations cause actions and ventures that are 
more difficult to fit in the surrounding world and they are a potential source of 
conflict with sufficient number of entities on the international stage where specif-
ics of national aspirations and related activities, are mostly expressed.
Traditional mass evaluations result in corresponding political behavior, and 
multi-party competition drives political organizations and their management to 
the formulation of such programs and managing such policies which are largely 
in line with that tradition turned to aspirations of the voting masses. There is 
very little chance of occurrence of such epochal political organizations and their 
leaderships - previously there were no - which will tackle the gigantic task of radi-
cal change of the people’s attachment to the past and yet, like Ataturk, succeed in 
the conservative electorate to provide the necessary support. Deep roots in the 
strategic choices turned to the past and related to the tradition are insurmount-
able impediment for the urgent necessary process of modernization, and thus for 
crucial start, acceleration and maintaining long-awaited successful economic and 
social development. 
The inspiration for the attribute pledged came from an important text by 
Latinka Perović (2015, passim, inter alia, on p. 192), where she talks about undis-
rupted stability of pledged objectives, which turned the policy of the Serbian states 
almost continuously to the aspirations of liberation and unification of the Serbian 
countries, which directed the national energy and resources to national apothe-
osis, fundamentally different and diametrically distant from the modernization 
of society and the definitive start of economic development, even though priori-
ties were right there located and objectively given to undeveloped economy and 
society in the initial, quite rudimentary stage of development. 
A small country should always bear in mind the modest parameters which 
measure its size and the corresponding limited power that is inherent to such 
country. Otherwise it faces harsh restrictions discussed in advance that are an-
other name for the goals and aspirations of more powerful political players on 
the international stage, especially those that have a dominant position and role 
in world affairs. The result of obsessive attachment to traditionally consecrated 
national objectives is frequent clashes with neighbors and collides with the domi-
nant entities. These conflicts and collisions deplete national energy and resources, 
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and the corresponding slowdown in growth and the lack of modernization result 
in less economic and political power in the long-term dynamic context, and thus 
ultimately to the lower degree of realization of pledged objectives that separate 
society from the real development priorities.
The struggle to achieve pledged objectives means the conflicts which bring 
irreparable losses and put society to the lowest position in the development scale, 
but even on this basis the pledged objectives of maximum national emancipation 
of the people are inhibitory and counterproductive. National objectives are par-
ticularly hazardous in conflicts with the dominant entities in world affairs, with 
the forces that impose huge losses, among other things in population, and often 
they end in less favorable outcomes than they otherwise would. National heroism 
is not an effective way of realization of national aspirations. It seems that there 
is still no proper analysis of benefits and costs of the aforementioned infamous 
March 27, 1941, and especially the analysis of the costs paid in hundreds of thou-
sands of human lives. Should we exclude a priori the possibility that Prince Paul 
assessed better than others what was then a complex geopolitical situation and he 
was right and all alone against the masses who passionately waved at the Belgrade 
squares refusing to side with the powerful forces they were not able then to op-
pose effectively? Would the Second World War have ended differently if March 2 
simply had not happened in Serbia? Could the war ultimately have ended worse 
for the Serbs than it actually had ended? What would a cost-benefit analysis of 
the heroic retreat over the Albanian ravines look like? Would the First World War 
have ended differently if the Serbs had not given so many lives in that withdrawal, 
including the inimitable poet Vladislav Petković Dis?
The continuity in the tradition of heroism of the Serbian people is interesting. 
It was manifested through two world wars, the wars that preceded them and the 
serious conflicts that arose in the process of transition to a parliamentary democ-
racy during the tragic breakup of Yugoslavia. Among the nations that were hit by 
the transition the Serbs showed the greatest resistance to the main flows of insti-
tutional transformation that was supposed to take us to capitalism. Predictably, 
this resulted in resistance to the new centers of domination that were brought, 
or better to say reallocated by a new time. Without going into details about the 
reasons for this resistance, which certainly had its objective determinants, the 
fact is that all countries around us, including - as sometimes claimed - tradition-
ally heroic Montenegro, adjusted better to transitional flows, because it seemed 
that they showed a higher degree of obedience, and more refined analyses would 
show that they fitted better into the objectively given limitations they could not 
mitigate, nor eliminate. It seems that substantially they were not in the worse 
position than Serbia. On the contrary.
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Are there going to be in due course any serious calculations about how Serbia 
and the Serbian people outside Serbia fit into the contemporary, including all 
those from earlier times, geopolitical constraints? Has heroism ever been worth 
and is it today? Does heroism in general contribute to, or subtract, the realization 
of pledged objectives ultimately inspired by? Poet Lj. Simović (2016) posed in his 
poetic way several dramatically intoned but indeed essential questions regarding 
our historical tendency to engage in attempts to realize grandiose national objec-
tives (pledged objectives by L. Perović), and in a discreet way he came up with the 
question asking what we achieved in that fight and even how much such struggle 
contributed to the realization of these objectives. The poet asked crude but ben-
eficially sobering questions.
This occasion again raises questions of the original paths in the development 
of socio-economic system and falling into the constellations in which we system-
atically and significantly differ from our surroundings. The system of socialist 
self-management was for our environment always such a slightly bizarre episode 
in our development. The originality in the creation of the institutional system 
bumps into two categories of always current and in fact binding constraints, 
which if being ignored causes significant cost: those that stem from the inter-
ests of powerful entities and those particularly important that are built into the 
mechanisms and structures of even rudimentary institutional order in the sphere 
of international economic and political relations. This second class of restrictions 
is the result of systematism of operations which in their current operations, and as 
a byproduct of current policies, are generated by the entities on the world stage, 
in a way the larger the players the greater the extent. Constraints of this class also 
stem from system creation of policies of certain entities interested in building nec-
essary coordinating structures within the limits of the possible with conscious, 
planned efforts in the field of institutional engineering. What they create with 
sensible spending of creative efforts, time and resources they are ready, of course, 
to defend vigorously and no one should be surprised at punitive retaliatory reac-
tions to those who, conditionally speaking, behave in antisystemic way.
These are the reasons why small countries should not forget at any moment 
that they are really small, and that the corresponding parameters of their modest 
size condition their equally modest power too. The realization of national goals, 
no matter how pledged and sublime they are, can be more or less successful only 
if the country equally successfully fits into its international environment and is 
well-oriented with respect to the objectives and the accompanying power of en-
tities with whom it is in the inevitable interaction. To be successful, the small 
must adapt to the large. The very success in achieving national targets essentially 
depends and will depend on the manner and the extent of fitting into the plans 
and aspirations of the world powers. In the area of national aspirations, nothing 
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worthwhile can be achieved by the one who is stranded on the cliffs of conflicting 
needs and strategic preferences of those who as the powerful planetary potentates 
largely tailor and predetermine the fate of the world. 
For good effects in the realization of its aspirations it is important, among 
other things, to choose the “right side”, i.e. assess the relative achievements of 
the most important players on the world stage and embrace the ones with whom 
they can reach their goals. Heroic victims given in the episodes of large upswing 
taken only for the purpose of glorious promotion of their nation and the state 
may have a particular aesthetic and ethical value, but they never generate irrel-
evant pragmatic value. Those who heroically fall for national ideals, if it is only for 
that reason, contribute nothing with these ideals. It is particularly important that 
national policy is not irreversible seized by the obsession of dignity, because if it 
diverts efforts and activities away from the orientation of the current configura-
tion of power or against them, the battle for the realization of national mission 
is inevitably lost. With this decisive battle the dignity is lost too, this enduring 
inspiration for great social endeavor. In the modern world, just like in any other 
relations and circumstances, almost nobody appreciates and respects the loser.
* 
This is the point when it is appropriate to conclude these considerations of ra-
tional ways of realization of major general social interest, including the achieve-
ment of possible pledged national objectives. In terms of methodology, the idea 
was to run this analysis in the sense of the so-called economic-imperialism. This 
“imperialism” consists of applying theoretical reasoning developed for the needs 
of the economics, and then the associated, appropriate and inherent analytical 
methods in the areas outside economics and sometimes distant from it. These 
elementary, at the same time fundamental, economic categories - preferences, 
alternatives and constraints - were applied to the permanent search for expedi-
ent paths of reaching major general social goals, including those that normally 
qualify as national. It is always about a critical attitude towards the current reality 
for which some new alternatives are always invented in the search for improve-
ments and program projections, and these alternative options are perceived and 
qualified as superior from the standpoint of current preferences, and in finding 
ways and means of realization of desirable alternatives there are inevitable and 
utterly diverse constraints. A world without constraints would be a kind of para-
dise, everything would be available there, but confrontation with the constraints 
is one of the reliable signs of sober and realistic thinking about a better future.
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